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I. INTRODUCTION
As in most jurisdictions in the United States, Ohio law imposes limitations
on the kinds of judicial determinations that are appealable. 2 The general rule
governing appellate practice throughout the United States is that appeals can
only be taken from a final judgment, a principle known as the final judgment
rule.3 The final judgment rule promotes judicial efficiency by ensuring the
steady progress of litigation, unhampered by appeals prior to a resolution on
the merits. 4 On the other hand, the final judgment rule's rigidity can cause
hardship and injustice that might be avoided by allowing interlocutory appeals
prior to final judgment.5 As a result, every jurisdiction in the United States has
made some provision for exceptions to the final judgment rule.6
In deciding which circumstances should be considered an exception to the
final judgment rule, courts weigh the competing rationales of judicial economy
and fairness to the litigants. As an example of this process, federal courts have
created exceptions to the rule, which include permitting appeals of an order
overruling a criminal defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of double
1This note is dedicated to the memory of my beloved father, David Gitlin, who
passed away shortly before its publication.
2 The state of New York is a notable exception that imposes "virtually no restrictions"
on the right to appeal ... [from an] order or judgment ... " See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU,
MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS § 4.12, at 63
(1983)[hereinafter MARTINEAU].
31d. at 47-48.
41d.
5Id.
61d. at 47-48, 60-61.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
jeopardy.7 On the other hand, examples of where the process has led federal
courts to reject attempts to create exceptions include an order disqualifying
counsel, 8 and an order denying certification of a class action.9 In contrast to
federal practice, Ohio courts have reached directly opposite results when
considering these same issues.1 0
Ohio's remarkable approach to interlocutory appeals stems from the Ohio
Supreme Court's evolving and strangely inconsistent interpretations of Ohio's
final order rule. Ohio's final order rule is set forth in Ohio Revised Code Section
2505.02:
An order that affects a substantial right in an action which in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment, an order that affects a
substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary
application in an action after judgment, or an order that vacates or sets
aside a judgment or grants a new trial is a final order that may be
reviewed, affirmed, modified, with or without retrial.
11
The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the authority of Ohio
appellate courts to hear interlocutory appeals is conferred by the second prong
of Ohio's final order rule: "an order [that] affect[s] a substantial right made in
a special proceeding."12 The "special proceeding" prong of Ohio's final order
rule is deemed to permit appeals from various interlocutory orders and from
certain statutorily defined proceedings. 13 Thus, from the point of view of Ohio
law, an appealable interlocutory order is "an order affecting a substantial right
made in a special proceeding."14
This note will analyze special proceedings in Ohio insofar as they relate to
the appealability of interlocutory orders. Because of the complex and evolving
nature of the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of special proceedings, this
note's analysis must necessarily be largely descriptive of Ohio case law. In
7 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
8See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
9See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
10See State v. Crago, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (Ohio 1990) (finding that an order overruling
a defendant's motion to dismiss on the gounds of double jeopardy is not appealable),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 941 (1991); Russell v. Mercy Hosp., 472 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1984)
(holding that granted motion resulting in disqualification of counsel is an appealable
order); Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio 1974) (finding that
denial of class certification is an appealable order).
11OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991).
12See, e.g., Amato v. General Motors Corp., 423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981).
13 E.g., id. (holding that certification of a class action is an appealable interlocutory
order) overruled by Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E. 2d 213 (Ohio, 1993); General Accident Ins.
Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 540 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 1989) (finding that declaratory judgment
action created by statute is a special proceeding).
14§ 2505.02.
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addition, this note will highlight differences between Ohio appellate practice
and federal practice in order to acquaint the reader with the dramatically
different results reached by the two systems.
In addition, Part II of this note will examine what is meant by the phrase
"substantial right," which appears in the second prong of Ohio's final order
rule. Part III will analyze the historical development of the special proceeding,
from its initial statutory creation to the landmark case of Amato v. General
Motors Corp.15 Part IV will examine a selection of post Amato cases to illustrate
the shortcomings of the Amato approach. In Part V, this note will scrutinize the
ideological split on the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the definition of special
proceedings and its influence on special proceedings jurisprudence. In Part VI,
this note will analyze Ohio's approach to the special proceedings prong of the
final judgment rule and suggest an alternative. Lastly, this note will discuss the
Ohio Supreme Court's most recent decisions concerning special proceedings.
II. WHAT IS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT?
In order to satisfy the second prong of Ohio's final order rule,16 an order
must both "[affect] a substantial right" and be "made in a special proceeding."17
Normally, dissecting statutes into component elements is a useful way to probe
the statute's meaning. Unfortunately, the special proceeding prong of Ohio's
final order rule defies such tidy analysis. A few cases perform an independent
inquiry as to the presence of a substantial right that has been affected by the
putative special proceeding. 18 Other cases fail to make such an independent
inquiry and suggest that the presence of a substantial right is intimately related
to whether the order is appealable as a special proceeding. 19 These latter cases
suggest that the substantial right inquiry can be collapsed into a ripeness
question: is review of the order premature or will a denial of the appeal
prejudice a party in such a way as to be irreparable on appeal after a final
disposition?20 Both kinds of inquiries will now be examined in further detail.
15423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981), overruled by Polikoff v. Adam 616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio
1993).
16 See supra Part I.
17§ 2505.02.
18 See, e.g., State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio 1984); State v.
Thomas, 400 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio 1980).
19 See, e.g., Amato v. General Motors Corp., 423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981); Smith v.
Chester Township Board of Trustees, 396 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1979).
20 0ne commentator suggests that the courts are employing, "an ad hoc, case-by-case
approach to determine whether certain rights have fallen within the penumbras of
substantiality and finality." See Comment, Determining Whether a Judicial Order is Final
and Appealable Under Ohio Law, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1337, 1342 (1990).
1993]
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An independent inquiry into the existence of a substantial right was made
in Armstrong v. Herancourt Brewing Co..21 The court proclaimed that, "[a]
substantial right involves the idea of a legal right,--one which is protected by
law."22 At issue in Armstrong was a court order mandating that the defendant
corporation disclose information to stockholders who had instituted an action
for dissolution of the corporation.23 The corporation appealed the order
requiring it to disclose the information, and the supreme court held that such
an order was not appealable since it did not affect a substantial right of the
corporation.24 The court reasoned that the corporation's desire not to disclose
was not a legally cognizable right since a corporation is created by statute and
the statute imposes a duty of disclosure in a proceeding of dissolution.25 Since
the statute that creates a corporation does not confer any right to refuse to
disclose information in a dissolution proceeding, the corporation could not
claim a substantial right was affected by an order requiring it to disclose. 26
A number of other decisions by Ohio courts have made independent
inquiries into the existence of a substantial right and rejected the existence of
such rights on statutory grounds. In State v. Jones,27 the court held that a
criminal defendant cannot appeal from an order denying shock probation,
even though such an order is made in a special proceeding.28 The court found
that there is no right to shock probation since it is entirely left to the discretion
of the trial court, and therefore, the denial of such a motion cannot affect a
substantial right.29
In a bizarre case involving a dispute between a judge and a police chief over
where a police van was being parked, the lack of a substantial right proved
dispositive in finding that an appeal could not proceed.30 The court found that
while a judge's order requiring the van to be parked so that it would not block
the courthouse driveway might have been made in a special proceeding, there
2142 N.E. 425 (Ohio 1895).
221d. at 427.
23 1d. at 425.
24 d. at 427.
25Id.
26Armstrong, 42 N.E. at 427.
27532 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
28 d. at 154.
291d.
301n re Obstruction of Summit County Driveway, 161 N.E.2d 452 (1959). The judge
apparently became frustra ted at repeatedly being blocked from access to the courthouse
by the police van. Id. at 453-54. The judge conducted an ex parte hearing and issued an
injunction enjoining the police chief and the police department from parking in a
manner that would obstruct his access to the courthouse. Id. at 454.
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was no legal right to park the van in such a manner, and thus the order could
not be appealed.3 1
Substantial rights are also created by legal principles arising from
non-statutory origin. In State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc.,32 the court found that
an order compelling the state to disclose the identity of a confidential informant
is reviewable as a special proceeding.33 The court cited approvingly an earlier
decision stating that, "[s]ociety has a substantial right to effectively enforce its
laws."34 Other common law concepts such as property rights have been held
to create substantial rights within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code
section 2505.02. 35 Also, rights protected by the United States Constitution are
deemed to be substantial.36
In some instances, however, there is no independent inquiry into the
existence of a substantial right and the denial of an appeal stems merely from
a finding that since the appeal is interlocutory in nature, it does not affect a
substantial right. In Smith v. Chester Township Board of Trustees,37 the township
board appealed from an order requiring it to bear the costs of preparing a
transcript of proceedings it conducted in firing an employee.38 The Ohio
Supreme Court, in somewhat conclusory language, found that since the order
was interlocutory in character and any prejudice to the board could be
corrected on appeal pending final judgment, there was no substantial right
affected.39
Conversely, a substantial right is sometimes presumed to be affected by an
order made in a special proceeding if the order cannot effectively be reviewed
3 11d. at 455.
32465 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio 1984).
331d. at 868.
341d. at 867 (citing State v. Collins, 265 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 1970)); see infra part IV for a
more detailed discussion of Collins.
35 Cincinnati, Sandusky & Cleveland R.R. v. Sloan, 31 Ohio St. 1 (1876); William
Watson & Co. v. Sullivan, 5 Ohio St. 42 (1855).
36 State v. Thomas, 400 N.E.2d 897,901 (Ohio 1980)(the double jeopardy clause of the
U.S. Constitution confers a substantial right), overruled on other grounds by State v. Crago,
559 N.E.2d 1353 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 941 (1991).
37396 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1979).
381d. at 745.
391d. (citing Snell v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 54 N.E. 270 (Ohio 1899)). Snell involved an
order denying a motion for a change of venue. Id. at 270. The court employed a similarly
conclusory analysis as it did in Smith, and merely observed that the order was
interlocutory in character, and thus was not immediately appealable. Id. at 272; see also
City of Cincinnati v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 588 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 1992)(finding no
substantial right affected when appeal was not ripe even though the order was made
in a special proceeding); Hall China Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 364 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio
1977) (finding no substantial right affected by special proceeding since appeal was not
ripe).
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on appeal. A good illustration of this principle is found in Amato v. General
Motors Corp.40 In Amato, the court held that an order certifying an action as a
class action was reviewable as an order made in a special proceeding.41 The
court reasoned that the added burden of conducting litigation in the context of
a class action is impossible to undo if the order is reversed after final
judgment.42 Thus, Amato suggests that substantial rights can be created by the
impracticability of review after a final judgment.
In review, for the purposes of section 2505.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, a
substantial right is created in a number of ways. It can be created by statute, by
the common law or by constitutional principles. The practicability of an appeal
after final judgment or the conclusion of a proceeding can extinguish the
existence of a substantial right. Also, if an appeal is not practicable after final
judgment, a substantial right can be created by the burdens imposed by not
allowing an immediate appeal.
III. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO PRIOR TO AMATO
The term "special proceeding" has been a part of Ohio's final order rule since
the Code of Civil Procedure of 1853 (Code).43 A special proceeding was
intended to be distinct from an "action", which was defined by abolishing the
distinction between actions at law and equity, and replacing them with a
unitary "civil action". 4 The Code specified certain proceedings that would not
be subject to the new rules of civil procedure and designated them special
proceedings.45
40423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981), overruled by Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio
1993).
4 11d. at 456.
42 Id.
4 3Fields v. Fields, 94 N.E.2d 7,9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (citing OHIO REV. STAT. vol. 3,
§ 512, at 2021 (Curwen's 1854)("An Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure," passed
on March 11, 1853). In section 512 of this act a final order is defined as follows:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action when such order
in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order
affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, or upon a
summary application in an action after judgment is a final order which
may be vacated, modified or reversed as provided in this title.
Id. at 9 (quoting § 512, at 2021).
44See id. (citing OHIO REV. STAT. vol. 3, § 3,1939 (Curwen's 1854)). "Forms Abolished.
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such
actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished; and in their place there shall be
hereafter but one form of action which shall be called a civil action." Id. (quoting § 3, at
1939).
4 5The section dealing with exceptions to the new civil rules is as follows:
Code Not to Control Special Proceedings[:] ... Until the legislature shall
otherwise provide this Code shall not affect proceedings on Habeas
Corpus, Quo Warranto or to assess damages for private property taken
for public uses; or proceedings under the statutes for the settlement of
[Vol. 41:537
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The implications of the language defining special proceedings are that in
order for a proceeding to be "special", it must be unknown to law or equity
prior to the adoption of the Code in 1853.46 Also, proceedings that were deemed
"special proceedings" were subject to the procedural rules that were set forth
in the statutes that created them. 47 Thus, special proceedings were subject to
unique procedural rules entirely distinct from the procedures that governed
"actions".
An early illustration of the procedural uniqueness requirement of a special
proceeding is William Watson & Co. v. Sullivan.48 At issue in Sullivan was
whether an order of a trial court discharging an attachment on property is an
order made in a special proceeding.49 In finding that such an order was made
in special proceeding, the court reasoned as follows:
The code provides a mode of proceeding in attachment, which is called
a "provisional remedy". It provides, that at or after the commencement
of the action, an order of attachment may be obtained. In some cases
it is made by the clerk of the court; in others, by the court or a judge
thereof. It specifies particularly the grounds upon which such order
may be made. It requires the execution of a bond in some cases, to be
approved by the clerk, in double the amount of the plaintiff's claim,
with a condition, that the plaintiff will pay the defendant all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the order be
wrongfully obtained; and it provides, specially, the whole mode of
proceeding, upon and including the order, until the final disposition
of the property, whether the plaintiff obtains judgment or not; and is
in fact, in its very nature, a special proceeding.50
The Sullivan court observed that the proceeding of attachment, which was
created by the code of civil procedure, was not given the label of a special
estates of deceased persons; nor proceedings under statutes relating
to dower, divorce or alimony, or to set aside a will; nor proceedings under
statutes relating to apprentices, arbitration, bastardy, insolvent debtors;
nor any special statutory remedy not heretofore obtained by action;
but such proceedings may be prosecuted under the Code, whenever it is
applicable.
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. STAT. vol. 3, § 604, at 2036 (Curwen's 1854))(internal quotations
and emphasis omitted).
461d. (citing § 604, at 2036).
47 d. (citing § 604, at 2036).
485 Ohio St. 43 (1855).
491d. at 43-44.
501d.; accord Swift & Co. Packers v. Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950)(finding that an order vacating an attachment of property that constituted security for
a judgment is a final appealable order).
1993]
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proceeding.5 1 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that since attachment was not
obtained by action and was defined with a comprehensive procedural
framework, it must be a special proceeding.5 2 Sullivan thus established the
principle that when a proceeding is governed by a unique procedural structure
not applicable to actions, and is not itself an action, that proceeding is a special
proceeding.
In Cincinnati, Sandusky and Cleveland R.R. v. Sloan,53 the court extended its
reasoning in Sullivan to proceedings involving the appointment and removal
of receivers. 54 Sloan held that proceedings involving the appointment and
removal of receivers are special proceedings, and when a substantial right is
affected in such a proceeding, it is subject to appellate review.5 5 In comparing
the dispute before it with Sullivan, the Sloan court stated:
The issuing of an attachment and the appointment of a receiver in a
civil action are both proceedings which are merely ancillary or
auxiliary to the main action. The action may be prosecuted to final
judgment, either with or without such proceedings. These auxiliary
proceedings are merely intended to secure the means for satisfying the
final judgment in case the plaintiff should succeed in the action, and
they can only be resorted to where the special circumstances exist
which the law prescribes as the grounds for their institution.
56
Sloan thus announced an additional characteristic of a special proceeding.
The court spoke of the auxiliary nature of proceedings like attachment or the
appointment and removal of receivers. The implication of Sloan is that in
addition to a unique procedural framework, a special proceeding should be
ancillary or auxiliary to the main action and thus not be an integral part of it.
51 Sullivan, 5 Ohio St. at 44.
521d. at 44.
5331 Ohio St. 1 (1876).
541d. The plaintiff was a stock and bondholder of the defendant corporation and
claimed that the corporation had fallen past due in its obligations to him. Id. at 2. The
plaintiff moved that a receiver be appointed to take possession of the defendant's
property, which was granted. Id. Subsequently, the defendant moved to vacate the
receiver order, which the court did. Id. at 4. The plaintiff then appealed, claiming that a
substantial right was affected by an order made in a special proceeding. Id. at 6.
55Id. at 9; accord 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2)(1988) (stating that appointment of receivers is
a final appealable order by statute). Contra Warren v. Bergeron, 831 F. 2d 101 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding thatorder vacating the appointment of a receiver is nota final appealable
order).
56 Sloan, 31 Ohio St. at 7-8.
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In a continuing effort to more precisely define special proceedings, the Ohio
Supreme Court set forth what was to become an influential definition57 for
special proceedings in Missionary Soc"y of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ely:58
Our Code does not, as does the Code of New York, specify that every
remedy which is not an action is a special proceeding, nor do our
statutes give any definition of an action or a special proceeding. But
we suppose that any ordinary proceedings in a court of justice, by
which a party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a
public offense, involving process and pleadings, and ending in ajudgment, is an action, while every proceeding other than an action,
where a remedy is sought by an original application to a court for a
judgment or an order, is a special proceeding.59
Ely reiterated the requirement that a special proceeding must be distinct from
an action.60 What made Ely significant is that it introduced the idea that a
special proceeding is commenced by an original application to a court in a
manner distinct from that which initiates an action.61 It is also important to
realize that the result in Ely was necessary if the order at issue was to receive
any review at all.62 Thus, Ely used the special proceeding prong of the final
order rule to provide an avenue of review for a proceeding that otherwise
would have slipped through the cracks, since it was not recognized as an action.
The perhaps overly-expansive "original application" definition of special
proceedings enunciated in Ely set the stage for Squire v. Guardian Trust Co..63 In
Squire, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the claim that an order of revivor
against the personal representative of a deceased defendant is an order
affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding. 64 In reaching its
57 See Bembaum v. Silverstein, 406 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1980); State v. Collins, 265 N.E.2d
261 (Ohio 1970).
5847 N.E. 537 (Ohio 1897). The plaintiff (Missionary Society) made an application to
the probate court to admit the will of Albert Ely, deceased. The court refused to admit
the will, claiming that the will was not legally valid. The plaintiff appealed, and the
appeal was dismissed by the circuit court as not being within its jurisdiction (it was not
a final and appealable order). Id. The supreme court reversed, holding that the denial
of an application to the probate court for the admission of a will is an order that affects
a substantial right made in a special proceeding. Id. at 541.
59 d. at 538.
60 Id.
6lid.
621d. at 541.
6368 N.E.2d 312 (Ohio 1946).
64Id. at 313. The plaintiff, Squire, who was Superintendent of Banks, brought an
action against the Guardian Trust company and others for breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
at 312. Subsequently, some of the defendants died and Squire then obtained orders of
revivor against personal representatives of the deceased defendants. Id. The personal
1993]
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decision the court announced the principle that, "[tihe prompt and orderly
disposal of litigation is an object much to be desired, and the entertainment of
appeals from various orders made by the trial court during the progress of the
main action is not in pursuance of such object."65
Squire was a 4-3 decision with the dissent contending that the order did affect
a substantial right and was made in a special proceeding.66 Squire established
the principle that there is an important countervailing interest to finding that
a proceeding is a special proceeding, namely judicial economy.67 The Squire
court regarded the order of revivor fully capable of review after final judgment,
and thus the practicability of review after final judgment is a factor that
militates against a finding that a proceeding is special.68
If the practicability of review after final judgment militates against
immediate review, what happens if review after final judgment is not feasible?
This question was answered in State v. Collins.69 The Collins court ruled that an
order granting a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal trial is an appealable
order made in a special proceeding.70 In reaching its result, the court recited
the definition of a special proceeding that was offered in Missionary Soc'y of the
Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ely,71 and then added, "we are convinced that
modem exigency must not be left unattended solely upon the basis of academic
genealogy."72 The court went on to say that there was no doubt that the order
suppressing evidence in this case was a special proceeding since:
representatives appealed the order of revivor, which the court of appeals dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 313. The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that the order is
merely interlocutory in nature and does no more than substitute one party for another
in an already existing action. Id.
651d. at 314.
66 Id. (Turner, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that the defendants have a substantial
right to not having an action revived against them and that right can only be taken away
by statute. Id. at 316. Revivor is a special statutory remedy that is made by an original
application to a court. Id. Thus the order of revivor at issue in this case affected a
substantial right and was made in a special proceeding. Id. at 317.
67 d. at 314.
68Squire, 68 N.E.2d at 314.
69265 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 1970). Collins involved a prosecution for violation of liquor
laws. The trial court granted a motion to suppress evidence, which the state contended
was necessary in order to obtain a conviction. Id.
701d.; accord 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988) (providing statutory authorization for the
government to appeal from a trial court order granting a motion to suppress evidence
in a criminal proceeding provided that the U.S. attorney certifies that the appeal is not
for the purpose of delay and the evidence is substantial proof of a material fact in the
proceeding).
7147 N.E. 537 (Ohio 1897).
72 Collins, 265 N.E.2d at 263.
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the [state] represented in oral argument that the deprivation of the use
of the evidence suppressed below rendered it virtually impossible for
the state to obtain a conviction, and that without that evidence the
prosecution would be terminated. Society has a most substantial right
to the diligent prosecution of those accused of crime, and where
prosecution is irretrievably foreclosed through the suppression of
evidence, that right is clearly and adversely affected.73
Collins marked a turning point in the development of special proceedings
law in Ohio. By insisting that, "modem exigency must not be left unattended,"74
the Collins court dispensed with many of the previously established
requirements of a special proceeding. Collins established the principle that
impracticability of review after final judgment can be dispositive irrespective
of any other requirements in determining whether a proceeding is special.
The court extended the reasoning of Collins in State v. Thomas,75 holding that
an order overruling a criminal defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds
of double jeopardy was an order affecting a substantial right made in a special
proceeding. 76 The court observed that the constitutional protection of double
jeopardy is not only limited to precluding punishment twice for the same
offense, but also provides protection against being tried more than once for the
same offense.77 The court stated, "[i]t is clear that... an order affecting a right
of constitutional dimensions is an order affecting a substantial right within the
contemplation of R.C. § 2505.02."78 Using the logic presented in Collins, the
court stated:
We believe that a proceeding on a motion to dismiss for double
jeopardy should be considered a special proceeding as well. A claim of
double jeopardy raises an issue entirely collateral to the guilt or
731d. at 263. However, the court was unable to allow the state to prosecute an appeal
in this particular case because of a statutory restriction on the matters that a state may
appeal in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 266. Section 2945.70 of the Ohio Revised Code
limited state appeals to the following matters: motion to quash, plea in abatement, a
demurrer, or a motion in arrest of judgment. Id. at 264.
741d. at 263.
75400 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 852 (1980), overruled by State v. Moss,
433 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 1982), and overruled by State v. Crago 559 N.E.2d 1353 (Ohio 1990).
The defendant, Thomas, was indicted for aggravated robbery and he pleaded guilty to
the lesser offense of robbery. Later, the robbery victim died, and the state brought
involuntary manslaughter charges. The defendant moved to have the charges
dismissed, claiming a violation of the double jeopardy provision of the United States
Constitution. Id.
761d.; accord Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that the collateral
order doctrine permits immediate appeal of a denial of a criminal defendant's motion
to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy).
77Thomas, 400 N.E.2d at 901.
781d. (internal quotations omitted).
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innocence of the defendant. While it is a complete defense, it is more
than that, for it, in principle, bars a new trial as well as a new
conviction. Additionally, an erroneous decision on a double jeopardy
claim cannot be effectively reviewed after judgment within the second
trial; by that time, the defendant's right has been violated.
79
The result reached in Thomas is the inevitable result of the slippery slope
introduced in Collins with regard to analysis of special proceedings.
80 Collins
established the precedent that impracticability of review after final judgment
was a sufficient criteria for finding that an order was made in a special
proceeding, 81 and the Thomas court simply followed suit. Thomas did, however,
refer to the 'collateral' nature of a motion to dismiss on the grounds of double
jeopardy,82 but in view of the subsequent decisions involving special
proceedings, it is not at all clear how important collaterality is in making such
a finding.
As might be expected, after the Collins and Thomas decisions,
'impracticability of review after final judgment' became standard boilerplate
language in appeals from interlocutory orders. In Bernbaum v. Silverstein,8
3 the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected such a claim in holding that an order overruling
a motion to disqualify counsel is not an order made in a special proceeding.
84
The court observed:
Research discloses that a prime determinant of whether a particular
order is one made in a special proceeding is the practicability of appeal
after final judgment. A ruling which implicates a claim of right that
would be irreparably lost if its review need await final judgment is
likely to be deemed a final order.
85
The court rejected the contention by the defendants that postponed review
of their claim would preclude effective review since any disclosures made by
79 1d.
80Thonas was subsequently overruled by State v. Crago, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (Ohio 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 941 (1991).
81State v. Collins, 265 N.E.2d 261, 263 (Ohio 1970).
82 Thomas, 400 N.E.2d at 901.
83406 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1980). In Bernbaum, limited partners of a cable television
business sued the general partners for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 533.
The defendants moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the grounds that members of
the law firm representing the plaintiffs had at one time represented the defendants. The
trial court overruled the motion, and the defendants appealed. The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of a final and appealable order. Id. The supreme court
affirmed. Id. at 535.
841d.; accord Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (holding that the
collateral order doctrine of federal practice does not allow an interlocutory appeal of
the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel).
85Bernbaum, 406 N.E.2d at 534-35.
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their old attorneys could not be corrected in a second trial.86 The court reasoned
that an attorney's improper disclosure could not be readily cured by an
immediate appeal since any improper disclosures are likely to be made well
before disqualification proceedings. 87 The court noted that the requirement
that a special proceeding be initiated by "original application" as outlined in
Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ely,88 was dispensed with
in Collins and Thomas because of the court's concern that, "there be an effective
mode of review of such rulings."89
After Bernbaum, the state of the law regarding special proceedings was in
great need of clarification. Unfortunately, in the case of Amato v. General Motors
Corp.,90 the court instead expanded the definition of special proceedings, and
in the process gave little guidance as to what proceedings were 'special.' Amato
addressed the mirror image of the issue presented in Roemisch v. Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co.91 and held that a trial court's order certifying an action as
a class action was a final and appealable order.92
The Amato court reasoned that the line of cases in Ohio dealing with special
proceedings present certain principles that must be considered in determining
whether an interlocutory order is appealable. 93 First, the court observed that a
guiding principle is "the prompt and orderly disposal of litigation."94 A second
guiding principle, noted by the court, is "the practicability of appeal after final
judgment."95 The court reasoned that the two principles should be weighed in
a balancing test in order to determine whether an order affects a substantial
861d. at 535.
8 7Id.
8847 N.E. 537 (Ohio 1897).
8 9Bernbaum, 406 N.E.2d at 535.
90423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981), overruled by Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio
1993).
91314 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio 1974). Roenisch held that a denial of class action certification
is a final and appealable order since the order affects a substantial right of the class
which, "in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment." Id. at 388. Contra
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (rejecting the "death knell" doctrine
and holding such orders to be nonappealable).
92 Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 453. A consumer of a General Motors automobile sued the
company when he discovered that the Oldsmobile he had purchased was equipped
with a Chevrolet engine. The plaintiff moved pursuant to Rule 23 to certify the action
as a class action on behalf of all Ohio consumers similarly situated. The trial court ruled
that the action was maintainable as a class action. General Motors appealed the trial
court decision to the court of appeals, which dismissed the appeal for lack of a final
appealable order. Id.
931d. at 455.
941d. (citing Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., 68 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ohio 1946)).
951d. at 455-56 (citing Bernbaurn, 406 N.E.2d 532, 534).
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right in a special proceeding: "[the] test weighs the harm to the 'prompt and
orderly disposition of litigation' and the consequent waste of judicial resources,
resulting from the allowance of an appeal, with the need for immediate review
because appeal after final judgment is not practicable."%
In applying its test to the facts before it, the Amato court ruled that the
certification order was final and appealable. 97 The court reasoned that it was
not certain that judicial economy would be compromised by allowing an
immediate appeal since the added burdens on the court of conducting class
action litigation were significant, thus a reversal of the order would promote
judicial efficiency.98 The court also observed that immediate review of such an
order is necessary because of the added burdens placed on the defendant,
which are impossible to undo if review of the order is postponed until after
final judgment.99
Amato, under the guise of unifying the case law that preceded it, greatly
expanded the scope of the special proceeding prong of the final order rule. By
focusing solely on the issues of judicial economy and impracticability of review
after final judgment, Amato assured a permanent departure from the kinds of
inquiries that were previously necessary to determine whether a proceeding
was special. The balancing test further undermines the vitality of the final order
rule since all that is required for immediate review is that the impracticability
of review after final judgment 'outweigh' considerations of judicial economy.
IV. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AFTER AMATO
Since Amato, determining whether an interlocutory order is an order
affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding is like shooting at a
moving target.100 An examination of the cases dealing with special proceedings
after Amato, if anything, demonstrates how unworkable the Ohio Supreme
96 d. at 456. The analog in federal practice to the Amato balancing test is the collateral
order doctrine. The collateral order doctrine treats an interlocutory order as final and
subject to immediate review if it: 1) conclusively determines an issue and is not subject
to revision; 2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action; and 3) is effectively unreviewable upon appeal of the final judgment. See
MARTINEAU, supra note 2, at 56.
97Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 456.
981d.
99 d.
1001n the words of one commentator, "In essence, the balancing test boils down to this:
If at least two of the appellate judges feel like hearing the case, the interlocutory order
is an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding; otherwise, it is
not." J. PATRICK BROWNE, PITFALLS AND PRACTICE IN APPELLATE PROCEDURE 16
(unpublished article on file with the author).
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Court's approach to final appealable orders has become.101 The cases evince alack of consistently applied rationale and when viewed in the aggregate, give
little guidance to the practitioner as to what is a final order.102
In a classic display of how balancing tests can be misused, the court in City
of Columbus v. Adams103 held that a pretrial suspension of suspected drunk
drivers' driving privileges is not a final and appealable order.104 The appellees
argued that an appeal after final judgment is not practicable because the pretrial
suspension of the ability to drive cannot be undone by an appeal after finaljudgment.105 In applying the Amato balancing test, the court agreed that the
impracticability of appeal after judgment is a factor to consider in deciding
whether an order is final and appealable, but the court found that the
countervailing interest of society in keeping drunk drivers off the road
outweighed the appellees interest in securing immediate review. 10 6
101Conpare Russell v. Mercy Hosp., 472 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1984)(holding that the
granting of a motion to disqualify counsel is a final appealable order) with Bernbaum v.Silverstein, 406 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1980)(holding that overruling a motion to disqualify
counsel is not a final appealable order).
102 Conpare State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio 1984) (applying
Amato test to find special proceeding) with General Accident Insurance Co. v. Ins. Co.
of N. Am., 540 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 1989)(finding a special proceeding without applying
Amato test). But see infra part VII.
103461 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio 1984).
104 d. Consolidated appeals of parties whose driver's licenses were suspended in a
preliminary hearing charging them with violating Ohio's drunk driving law. Id. at 889.
The parties filed appeals to have the orders that their drivers licenses be suspended
reviewed. The court of appeals ruled that the drivers license suspensions were final
appealable orders. Id. The supreme court reversed in a 4-3 decision. Id. at 890.
105 Id. at 889.
106 The opinion of the supreme court stated:
Without question, the pretrial suspension of the operator's license of
one accused of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol is beneficial to society if the accused is ultimately convicted
because the risk posed by the drunk driver is eliminated at an early
stage in the proceeding. In that respect, appellant has identified a legi-
timate interest militating against immediate review of the pretrial
suspension orders. Indeed, the catastrophes associated with drunk
driving, the tragic loss of life and the permanent debilitating injuries
that can result have reached nearly epidemic proportions across the
nation. This has prompted aggressive and positive steps to combat this
carnage by volunteer groups and the private sector as well as various
state legislatures, including our own. Were immediate review available,
the accused could obtain a stay of the suspension order pending out-
come of the appeal and, according to appellant, circumvent the purpose
behind allowing for the pretrial suspension of an operator's license of
one meeting the criteria of R.C. 4511.191(K).
Id. at 890.
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The dissent correctly argued that the majority misapplied the balancing test
set forth in Amato.107 Justice Sweeney argued that a substantial right is
implicated in actions of this type based on the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.10 8 The dissenting
Justice further observed that the majority mistakenly applied the policy
rationale of Ohio's drunk driving law 109 as a countervailing interest to
immediate review instead of following the requirements of Amato, which
would dictate that judicial economy be weighed against the interest in
immediate review. 110
In State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc., the court applied the Amato balancing
test and reversed a longstanding policy against allowing appeals from
discovery orders.111 The court held that an order compelling the state to divulge
the identity of a confidential informant is an order affecting a substantial right
made in a special proceeding. 112 The court reasoned that the damage the state
would incur through compliance with the order could not be corrected on
appeal after judgment.113 In ruling that the order was an appealable order made
in a special proceeding, the court observed that any harm to judicial economy
was clearly outweighed by the state's interest in effective law enforcement.
114
1071d. at 891 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
108 Columbus, 461 N.E.2d at 891 (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)).
109OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(K)(Anderson 1991).
11OColumbus, 461 N.E.2d at 891.
111465 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio 1984). The State of Ohio brought the action against Port
Clinton Fisheries to recover damages for wrongful conversion of some 67,000 pounds
of walleye fished from the waters of Lake Erie. Id. at 865. Through discovery, the
defendant found that the state's investigation was prompted by information provided
by two confidential informants. The defendant filed a motion to compel disclosure of
the identities of the informants, or in the alternative, to dismiss the action. The court
subsequently ordered the disclosure of the name of one of the confidential informants.
The state appealed the order, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of
a final and appealable order. Id.
1121d. at 867. Contra Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978) (holding that the government could not appeal
from a discovery order requiring it to reveal the names of eighteen persons who gave
the government information about the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist
Alliance). It is interesting to note that Ohio had consistently disallowed the appeal of
discovery orders prior to Port Clinton Fisheries. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Chalfin, 310 N.E.2d
233 (Ohio 1974); Klein v. Bendix Westinghouse Co., 234 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio 1968). After
Port Clinton Fisheries, a number of cases have held discovery orders to be appealable.
See, e.g., Humphry v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio 1986)(order
compelling hospital to disclose the names of patients); Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 538
N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1988)(order compelling the disclosure of a person infected with AIDS);
see also Stanley B. Kent, Appealability of Discovery Orders, CLEVELAND B. J. 354 (1989).
113Port Clinton Fisheries, 465 N.E.2d at 867-68.
1141d. (basing its rationale on language used in State v. Collins, 265 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio
1970)); see supra text accompanying note 73.
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Two justices dissented from the holding in Port Clinton Fisheries.115 One of
the dissenters, Justice William Brown, observed that the court had previously
addressed the question of whether discovery orders were special proceedings
in Kennedy v. Cha/fin116 and found that they were not.117 The dissent went on
to point out that other kinds of discovery orders are not sufficiently distinct
from that in the instant case to avoid wholesale destruction of the policy against
interlocutory appeals of discovery orders. 118
In another application of the Amato balancing test, Tilberry v. Body 119 held
that a trial court order of dissolution of a partnership is a final appealable order
prior to the winding up of partnership affairs. 120 The court reasoned that
substantial rights of the partners were affected because the partnership was
dissolved pursuant to Section 1775.31(A) of the Ohio Revised Code rather than
in accordance with the terms specified in the partnership agreement.12 1
Further, the court found that the order of dissolution satisfied the Amato
requirements for a special proceeding because the dissolution was ordered
pursuant to Section 1775.31(A), and the Amato balancing test tipped in favor of
allowing an immediate appeal. 122 The court found that unnecessary winding
115Id. at 869 (W. Brown, J., dissenting).
116310 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio 1974).
117Port Clinton Fisheries, 465 N.E.2d at 869 (W. Brown, J., dissenting). The Kennedy
opinion stated:
Discovery orders have long been considered interlocutory.
[Dliscovery techniques are pretrial procedures used as an adjunct to
be [sic] a pending lawsuit. They are designed to aid in the final disposi-
tion of the litigation, and are, therefore, to be considered as an integral
part of the action in which they are utilized. They are not special pro-
ceedings as that phrase is used in R.C. 2505.02.
Id. at 869 (citing Kennedy v. Chalfin, 310 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Ohio 1974))(intemal
quotations omitted allegations and omissions in original).
1 18 Id.
119493 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio 1986).
1201d. Tilberry involved an action for the dissolution of a partnership. Id. The court
ordered a dissolution of the partnership, but prior to the winding up of partnership
affairs, the defendants appealed the order of the dissolution. Id. at 956. The court of
appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final and appealable order. Id. The supreme
court reversed, finding that an order of a dissolution of a partnership short of the
winding up of partnership affairs is an order affecting a substantial right made in a
special proceeding. Id. at 957-58.
121Id. at 957. The significance of a dissolution pursuant to statute, according to the
court, was that the statutory dissolution "greatly alter[ed]" the original agreement of the
parties, thus compromising substantial rights. Id.
1221d. It is not clear why the court found it significant that the dissolution order was
made pursuant to OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1775.31(A) (Anderson 1991) for the purposes
of determining whether the order was made in a special proceeding. A likely
explanation is that "academic genealogy" is creeping back into the court's analysis of
special proceedings. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text and infra Part VII.
19931
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
up of the partnership (if on appeal it was determined that the dissolution was
improper) would actually waste judicial resources, and thus an immediate
appeal was appropriate.123
In a curious departure from Amato and arguably a return to classical special
proceedings analysis, 124 a unanimous court in General Accident Insurance Co. v.
Ins. Co. of North America1 25 held that a declaratory judgment action is a special
proceeding.126 The court found that the question of whether there is a duty to
defend creates substantial rights both with the insured and the insurer.12 7 If the
question of whether there is a duty to defend is decided incorrectly, substantial
consequences will result.12 8 The court then approached the question of
whether a declaratory judgment action is a special proceeding.129 Curiously,
the court did not apply the Amato balancing test in reaching the conclusion that
a declaratory judgment action is a special proceeding.130 Instead, the court
observed that declaratory judgment actions are a special remedy not available
at common law or in equity.131 The court also observed that the statutory
authorization for declaratory judgments is found in section 2721 of the Ohio
Revised Code, and the statutory provision, "provides a complete statutory
123 Tilberry, 493 N.E.2d at 958. Justice Douglas filed an important dissent in Tilberry.
Id. at 958 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see infra part V.
124Classical analysis of special proceedings would revive the analysis used in the early
cases and require that the proceeding be unknown to law or equity and have a unique
procedural framework before it would qualify as a special proceeding. See supra notes
43-47 and accompanying text.
125540 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 1989). After an action was settled concerning defects in the
design and construction of coke ovens for an industrial plant, a group of insurers who
had covered the liability sought a declaratory judgment that another group of insurers
were responsible to cover a portion of the liability. Id. at 268-69. On cross motions for
summary judgment, the trial court ruled that one of the defendants, the general liability
insurer, Ins. Co. of North America (INA), had no liability as a result of its policy
agreement. Id. at 269. The trial court, as part of its order, added the language, "no just
reason for delay" pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(b) in dismissing INA from the lawsuit.
Id. at 269. The plaintiffs appealed INA's dismissal from the lawsuit and the court of
appeals dismissed the appeal without comment. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the declaratory judgment action affected a substantial right in a special
proceeding. Id. at 272.
1261d. at 271-72; accord 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988) (specifying that a declaratory judgment
"shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
such.").
12 7General Accident, 540 N.E.2d at 271.
128 Id.
129Id.
1301d.
1311d. at 271-72.
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scheme for obtaining declaratory relief."132 As a result, a declaratory judgment
action is a special proceeding. 133
Despite a seeming resurgence of classical special proceedings analysis,
Stewart v. Midwestern Indemnity Co.134 holds that an order of a trial court
vacating an arbitration award and resubmitting the matter for arbitration is not
a final and appealable order.135 The court employed the first prong of Ohio's
final order rule and concluded that the order, "cannot be considered a
'determin[ation of] the action' or one which 'prevents a judgment' within the
meaning of R.C. § 2505.02."136 The Stewart court's analysis is strange because
it did not make any reference to the special proceeding prong of the final order
rule, 137 and as both dissenting justices pointed out, arbitration is, in the classical
sense, a special proceeding.138
132540 N.E.2d at 271-72.
1331d. The decision in General Accident suggests that the classical definition of special
proceedings is still relevant to the determination of which proceedings are "special."
Presumably, then, there are two ways to argue that a proceeding is a special proceeding:
1) the Anato balancing test weighs in favor of review; and 2) the proceeding is a unique
statutory remedy unknown to law or equity, that is governed by procedural rules totally
distinct from those governing actions. But see infra Part VII.
134543 N.E.2d 1200 (Ohio 1989). Stewart was injured in an automobile accident with
an uninsured motorist, and sought compensation from her insurance company. Id. at
1201. The insurance company disputed the amountof theplaintiff's claim, at which time
the plaintiff filed suit against the insurance company. The insurance company sought
to exercise its option to submit the dispute to arbitration, and the trial court found that
the terms of the policy compelled arbitration, but the plaintiff's action in the trial court
could remain since there were other damages that were not subject to arbitration. The
arbitration panel awarded the plaintiff damages, but the plaintiff moved to vacate the
arbitration award, claiming that the arbitration panel had failed to address all of the
issues presented. The trial court vacated the earlier arbitration award and ordered that
the matter be submitted to a new arbitration panel. The defendant appealed the trial
court's order and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final and
appealable order. Id. The supreme court affirmed. Id. at 1202.
13 51d. Contra 9 U.S.C.A. § 16(a)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1993) (providing statutory
authorization for an appeal from an order "modifying, correcting, or vacating an award"
in an arbitration proceeding).
136 Stewart, 543 N.E.2d at 1202.
1371d. The court instead focused on section 2711.10 of the Ohio Revised Code which
states:
In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall make
an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration if: ... The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made. If an award is
vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award
to be made has not expired, the court may direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
Id. at 1202 n.1 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Anderson 1991)). The Stewart
court reasoned that since § 2711.10 gives the trial court the authority to vacate an
19931
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The inevitable issue of whether failure to timely appeal an order made in a
special proceeding is fatal to preserving the issue on appeal after judgment
arose in Dayton Women's Health Center v. Enix.1 39 The court held that failure to
appeal an order of class certification within the time required by Appellate Rule
4(A)140 waives the right to preserve the issue for appeal after final judgment.141
The court noted that previous decisions in Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co. 142 and Amato v. General Motors Corp.143 established that an order denying
arbitration award and resubmit the matter to arbitration, the order is not final. Id. at
1202.
1381d. at 1203 (DouglasJ., dissenting); id. at 1204-05 (stating that arbitration is a special
remedy and, "provides a complete statutory scheme for obtaining relief .. "); see also
General Elec. Supply Co. v. Warden Elec., Inc., 528 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 1988) (stating that
an order of a trial court denying a stay of proceedings to permit arbitration and
dismissing arbitration proceedings is not a final appealable order).
139555 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1990). The plaintiff, a nonprofit provider of women's
reproductive health services, broughtan action forinjunctive relief and damages against
picketers who had interfered with the plaintiff's activities. The plaintiff moved to have
the defendants certified as a class. Id. Class certification was granted designating, "all
individuals protesting the activities conducted at the Dayton Women's Health Center."
Id. at957. The trial courtgranted the requested injunctive relief and enjoined all members
of the defendant class from protesting outside the plaintiff's health center. Id.
Representatives of the defendant class appealed the decision of the trial court, and the
court of appeals modified the injunctive relief ordered by the trial court, but held that
the defendants had failed to properly bring an appeal of the order certifying them as a
class. Id. The class certification orderwas made on January 15,1987, and the defendants
did not appeal until after final judgment on July 10, 1987 and thus the defendants failed
to bring an appeal within the required 30 days of a final order. Id.
14 00HIO R. APP. P. 4(A) provides that appeal must be taken from a final order within
thirty days of the date of entry of the order or judgment. Id. Failure to file the notice of
appeal in a timely manner deprives the appeals court of jurisdiction, and thus timely
filing cannot be waived. See Piper v. Burden, 476 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
14 1 Enix, 555 N.E.2d at 959. Contra In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F. 2d 179
(2nd Cir. 1987). A similar view is expressed in an influential treatise:
Any rule that requires forfeiture of appellate opportunities for guessing
wrong about doctrines of appealability that often are obscure would
greatly increase the costs of [the] collateral order doctrine by forcing
protective appeals in many situations in which appealability is uncertain
and in which all parties might prefer to await review on appeal from
the final judgment. Forfeiture, moreover, would trap some parties in a
box framed by a rule designed to alleviate untoward risks, not to create
them.
CHARLEsA. WRIGHT, ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3911,
359 (1992).
142314 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio 1974).
143423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981), overruled by Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio
1993).
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or granting class certification is a final and appealable order.144 Recognizing
that both Roemisch and Amato dealt with plaintiff class actions, the court found
that a defendant class action did not present a significant distinction, and thus
the order certifying the defendant class was a final appealable order.145
The Enix court was understandably regretful of the result they had to reach.
By creating the unintelligible quagmire of what had become special
proceedings jurisprudence, the court was forced to deny review to a
substantive legal claim after a final judgment. The court therefore set out a
footnote in the opinion which stated, "[w]e recommend that the Rules Advisory
Committee appointed by this court review whether an amendment to App.R.
4(A) should be adopted in order for a party to have the option of appealing an
interlocutory final appealable order after final judgment is rendered in a
case."146 The Rules Committee accordingly amended the appellate rules to
provide an escape hatch for future litigants who might become confused by
Ohio's special proceedings jurisprudence. 147
In a surprising and powerful resurgence of classical special proceedings
analysis, the court in State v. Crago148 overturned State v. Thomas149 and held
144Enix, 555 N.E.2d at 958.
145Id., overruled by Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio 1993).
14 61d. at 959 n.3.
14 70Hio R. APP. P. 4(B)(5)(amended July 1,1992). The staff notes of the rules committee
that accompanied the amendment state in pertinent part:
After studying the matter, the Committee concluded that a party should
have the option to appeal a partial final judgment or order either immed-
iately or at the end of the entire case. Without the option, a party who
wants to appeal a partial final judgment or order and who is in doubt
about whether it meets the test of finality in Amato will be forced to take
an immediate appeal to protect its right to appeal. It will then be up to
the court of appeals to decide whether the partial judgment or order
meets the test of Amato. Many unnecessary appeals may result. On the
other hand, a party who is unaware of the Anato and Dayton Wonen's
Health Center decisions may not seek to appeal a partial final judgment
or order until the final judgment is entered, and that is too late. Neither
result is desirable. For this reason, the rule is amended to give the party
the option to appeal immediately or at the end of the case.
SUPREME COURT RULES ADVISORY COMM., COMMENTARY APPENDED TO OHIO R. APP. P. 4
(1992). Justice Douglas repeated his displeasure with theAmato decision and announced
thathe stood ready to overrule it. Enix, 555 N.E.2d at 960 (Douglas,J., dissenting). Justice
Resnick also expressed displeasure at the Amato decision on the grounds that it had no
support in any other jurisdiction. Id. at 963 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
148559 N.E.2d 1353 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 941 (1991). Martin Crago was
charged with three counts of aggravated murder in the death of Edward Murray. Id. at
1354. Count one alleged that Crago purposefully murdered Murray with prior
calculation and design, count two alleged purposeful killing during the commission of
an aggravated robbery, and count three alleged purposefully killing during the course
of a kidnapping. At trial, the jury found Crago guilty of aggravated robbery and
kidnapping and not guilty of aggravated murder arising from kidnapping and found
him guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The jury was
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that a denial of a motion to dismiss criminal proceedings on the grounds of
double jeopardy is not an appealable interlocutory order.150 The opinion of the
court, written by Justice Douglas, states that the order of the trial court in the
instant case does not meet any of the prongs of Ohio's final order rule, and, as
such, the order cannot be reviewed before final judgment.15 1 The court thus
concluded that the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal
and vacated its order granting immediate review.152
In Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & Equip. Co.153 the court revisited the issue of the
appealability of discovery orders and held that an order compelling discovery
of alleged work product is not a final appealable order.154 The court reasoned
that interlocutory appeals of discovery orders interfere with judicial economy
and should only be allowed, "with much reluctance." 155 The court
distinguished the harm to a party through exposure of work product from
unable to reach a verdict on the aggravated murder charge arising from aggravated
robbery. The count of aggravated murder arising from robbery which previously
resulted in a mistrial was set for retrial and the defendant moved to dismiss on the
grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The defendant's motion was
overruled and the defendant appealed to the court of appeals. Id. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for dismissal on doublejeopardy grounds and affirmed in part the order dealing with collateral estoppel. Id. at
1354-55. The supreme court reversed. Id. at 1355.
149400 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 852 (1980), overruled by State v. Moss,
433 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 1982), and overruled by State v. Crago, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (Ohio 1990).
1501d. Contra Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that the collateral
order doctrine permits immediate appeal of a denial of a criminal defendant's motion
to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy).
151Crago, 559 N.E.2d at 1355. Justice Douglas' view of special proceedings would
permit no other outcome in this case. See Tilberry v. Body, 493 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio
1986)(Douglas, J., dissenting); see also infra part V.
152Crago, 559 N.E.2d at 1355. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion in which he
stated he was inclined to follow State v. Thomas, 400 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio 1980) in deciding
the instant case. Crago, 559 N.E.2d at 1356 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Sweeney, J.,
concurring with the dissent.
153588 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1992). Nelson brought an action against Toledo Oxygen and
Equip. Co. alleging that air tanks were improperly filled by the defendant. Id. at 789-90.
During the course of discovery, Toledo Oxygen filed a motion to compel the discovery
of Nelson's treating physician's reports. Id. at 790. Nelson filed a brief in opposition
claiming that the reports were work product since they were prepared for the purpose
of assisting Nelson's counsel prepare for litigation. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to compel the production of the documents. Nelson appealed and
the appeal was dismissed by the court of appeals for lack of a final appealable order. Id.
The supreme court affirmed. Id. at 792.
1541d.; accord American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d
277 (2nd Cir. 1967) (denying appeal from a discovery order requiring the disclosure of
information claimed to be protected by work-product privilege).
1S5 Nelson, 588 N.E.2d at 791.
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physician-patient privilege 56 by saying that work-product exposure is a harm
"peculiarly related to litigation."157 In applying the Amato balancing test, the
court reasoned that such harm does not outweigh considerations of judicial
economy.158
V. THE IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT ON THE OHIO SUPREME COURT
In the cases dealing with special proceedings that have reached the Ohio
Supreme Court since Amato, an ideological split has developed that pits the
classical view of special proceedings against the Amato balancing test.159 The
classical view has occasionally ruled the day and determined the outcome of
cases.160 But more often than not, Amato would provide the primary mode of
analysis.161
Justice Douglas is the only member of the Ohio Supreme Court who has
consistently voiced opposition to the Amato balancing test.162 Justice Resnick
criticized the holding in Amato on the grounds that it departed from the law in
every jurisdiction in the United States.163 The other justices appeared satisfied
with the Amato approach, although Amato analysis is notably absent in cases
where it could have been used.164
156See Humphry v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio 1986)(holding
that order compelling hospital to disclose the names of patients is a final appealable
order).
157Nelson, 588 N.E.2d at 792. The court reasoned that since work-product protection
is a litigational matter, appeals courts are equipped to provide appropriate relief for its
erroneous exposure in an appeal after final judgment. Id.
1581d. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion in which he reiterated his desire to
overrule Arnato, and cited the instant case as an example of the type of appeal that will
be routinely made since the outcome of the Atmato balancing test is impossible to predict.
Id. at 793 (Douglas, J. concurring).
15 9See, e.g., Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & Equip. Co., 588 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio
1992)(Douglas, J., concurring); State v. Crago, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (Ohio 1990)(opinion of
the court written by Douglas, J.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 941 (1991); Dayton Women's
Health Ctr. v. Enix, 555 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1990)(Douglas, J., dissenting); Stewart v.
Midwestern Indemnity Co., 543 N.E.2d 1200 (Ohio 1989)(Douglas, J., dissenting);
Tilberry v. Body, 493 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio 1986)(Douglas, J., dissenting); Humphry v.
Riverside Methodist Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio 1986)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
160Crago, 559 N.E.2d 1353; General Accident Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 540
N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 1989).
1,61Nelson, 588 N.E.2d 789; Tilberry, 493 N.E.2d 954; Hurnphry, 488 N.E.2d 877. But see
infra Part VII.
162See cases cited supra note 159.
163 Enix, 555 N.E.2d 956 (Resnick, J., dissenting). Justice Resnick's disagreement with
Arnato appears to be based more on the substantive outcome than with the application
of a balancing test to determine if a proceeding is "special." Id. at 963.
164See, e.g., Crago, 559 N.E.2d 1353; General Accident, 540 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 1989).
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Justice Douglas' classical view of special proceedings received its most
complete treatment in his dissent in Tilberry v. Body.165 His argument is that the
definition of special proceedings is contained in the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure. In dissent in Tilberry, Justice Douglas argues:
Civ. R. 2 states, "[t]here shall be only one form of action, and it shall be
known as a civil action."
Civ. R. 1 states that the Civil Rules prescribe the procedure to be
followed in all civil courts, except: "(C) * * * (1) upon appeal to review
any judgment, order or ruling, (2) in the appropriation of property, (3)
in forcible entry and detainer, (4) in small claims matters under
Chapter 1925, Revised Code, (5) in uniform reciprocal support actions,
(6) in the commitment of the mentally ill, (7) in all other special
statutory proceedings: * * .166
Justice Douglas argues that in order to satisfy rule 1(C)(7), the purported
special proceeding must statutorily specify the, "step-by-step procedures to be
utilized."167 The Douglas approach would revive the analysis of special
proceedings that was used in the early history of special proceedings law.168
The problem with Justice Douglas' approach is that it provides a paucity of
flexibility in an area where the Ohio Supreme Court has demanded increasing
authority to make ad hoc determinations of appealability since 1970.169
It is hard to imagine a scenario where Justice Douglas would accept a
definition of special proceedings that is anything but in accordance with the
classical definition. It is also equally hard to imagine the Ohio Supreme Court
closing the door on interlocutory appeals in all cases except where there is a
bona fide special proceeding in the classical sense. 170 Unless the Ohio Supreme
Court completely overhauls its approach to interlocutory appeals in a way that
does not rely on the special proceeding prong of the final order rule, it is likely
that the debate will rage on.
VI. ANALYSIS OF OHIO'S APPROACH TO INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
This note's analysis of special proceedings in Ohio will begin with a simple
working assumption: Ohio's approach of relying on the Amato balancing test
165493 N.E.2d 954 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16 6 d. at 958.
16 71d.
16 8See discussion of Watson supra Part Im. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text.
169State v. Collins, 265 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 1970) "[Wie are convinced that modem
exigency must not be left unattended solely upon the basis of academic genealogy." Id.
at 263.
170 0n August 11, 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court overruled Anato and imposed the
classical view of special proceedings as the law in Ohio. Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d
213 (Ohio 1993); see infra part VII.
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as a means of determining the availability of interloctory appeals is a failure. 171
The avowed policy of Ohio courts is to discourage interlocutory appeals and
yet the Amato balancing test has created judicial exceptions to the final order
rule that do not exist in any other jurisdiction. 172 Thus, the policy question for
Ohio is whether a more workable rule can be developed to screen interlocutory
appeals.
A number of commentators have advanced approaches to the problem of
when to allow interlocutory appeals.173 One solution is to eliminate the "as of
right" appeal entirely and to replace it with a system where appeals courts
exercise discretion over the appeals that are heard.174 Also, the balancing
approach has found support in the academic literature.175 Another method
suggested is that the extraordinary writ be used instead of the interlocutory
appeal. 176 Yet another suggestion is that exceptions to the final judgment rule
should be codified. 177
Professor Martineau, a noted expert in the field of appellate practice,
observes that each of the above suggestions has its drawbacks. 178 Abolishing
the "as of right" appeal, while providing appellate courts with better control
over dockets, would threaten the credibility of the judicial system and would
face severe opposition.179 The balancing approach leads to uncertainty as to
what orders are appealable and encourages review of those issues where
171 The author does not pretend to have "proven" this assumption. However, reference
to the preceding sections of this note suggest that Ohio's approach to interloctory
appeals is at best daunting to the practitioner, and at worst, unintelligible.
172General Elec. Supply Co. v. Warden Elec., Inc., 528 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 1988). "This
court has always been reluctant to allow immediate review of rulings made during the
pendency of an action." Id. at 197 (quoting City of Columbus v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887,
890 (Ohio 1984)). Despite such rhetoric the result in Amato is a departure from the law
in every jurisdiction in the United States. Dayton Women's Health Ctr. v. Enix, 555
N.E.2d 956, 963 (Ohio 1990) (Resnick, J., dissenting),
173MARTNEAU, supra note 2. Professor Martineau suggests that the final judgment rule
is inherently subject to exception due to the tension between judicial economy and
fairness to litigants. Id. at 67.
1741d. (citing Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE
L.J. 539, 554 (1932)); see also Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More of Less)
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985).
175 MARTINhEAU, supra note 2, at 67 (citing Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 97-102 (1975)).
176 MARTINEAU, supra note 2, at 68 (citing Note, Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Answer
to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 1102 (1950)).
177 MARTNEAU, supra note 2, at 68 (citing Lawyers Conference Committee on Federal
Courts and the Judiciary, The Finality Rule: A Proposal For Change, JUDGES' J., Fall 1980,
at 33).
178MARTINEAU, supra note 2, at 68.
179Id.
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appellate judges are anxious to reach the merits of the case.180 The use of
extraordinary writs to review interlocutory orders is criticized on the grounds
that it creates unwarranted broadening of the supervisory powers of the
appeals courts.181 The suggestion that exceptions to the final judgment rule be
codified does not avoid the problem of inflexibility of a final judgment rule:
there will always be situations where adherence to the statutory criteria will
make an unjust result unreviewable. 182
Professor Martineau suggests that the most workable solution to the
problem of when to allow interlocutory appeals is a proposal offered by the
American Bar Association in its Standards of Judicial Administration for
Appellate Courts.183 The proposal suggests a two-tiered appellate review
process: appeals from final judgments are as of right, and any nonfinal
judgments or orders are appealable at the discretion of the reviewing court,
subject to specified criteria. 184 A discretionary appeal would be permitted if the
appeal would: "(1) materially advance the termination of the litigation or
clarify further proceedings therein; (2) protect a party from substantial and
irreparable injury; or (3) clarify an issue of general importance in the
administration of justice."185
As Professor Martineau observes, the ABA plan has a number of important
advantages. The plan allows appellate courts to manage their dockets more
effectively since the appellate courts could exercise discretion in hearing
interlocutory appeals. It also provides built-in flexibility to accommodate the
various rationales that in the past have led to judicial exceptions to the final
judgment rule. In addition, the plan obviates the need for ongoing judicial
involvement in carving out exceptions to the final order rule.186
The ABA plan clearly appears to embody Ohio's stated judicial philosophy
towards interlocutory appeals more effectively than the Amato balancing
180 d. Compare Russell v. Mercy Hosp., 472 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1984)(holding that the
granting of a motion to disqualify counsel is nota final appealable order) with Bembaum
v. Silverstein, 406 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1980)(holding thatoverruling a motion to disqualify
counsel is not a final appelable order); See also City of Columbus v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d
887 (Ohio 1984) (reasoning that pretrial suspension of a drivers license is not appealable
since society's interest in keeping drunks off the road outweighs any interest in review).
181MARTINEAU, supra note 2, at 68. "Traditionally, extraordinary writs were to issue
only 'to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to
compel it to exercise it authority when it is its duty to do so."' Id. at 68 n.12 (quoting
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).
182 MARTINEAU, supra note 2, at 68-9.
18 3 1d. at 69 (citing AM. BAR AssN, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RELATING
TO APPELLATE COURTS, § 3.12 (1977)).
184 1d.
185 Id.
1861d. Professor Martineau also notes that the ABA plan has been adopted by
Wisconsin in 1978. Id. at 69-70.
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approach. 187 The question thus arises, can Ohio implement a version of the
ABA plan, and if so, how would such a plan be incorporated into Ohio's final
order rule? A necessary first step in this inquiry is to examine how Ohio
appellate courts derive their authority to hear appeals.
Art. IV, section 3, of the Ohio Constitution states, "Courts of Appeals shall
have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify,
or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court
of appeals within the district .... *"188 This provision of the Ohio Constitution
is held to, "empower the General Assembly to alter the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals."189 Thus, the Ohio General Assembly has the authority
to determine the kinds of orders that can be appealed within the constraints
imposed by the Ohio Constitution.
The General Assembly's definition of a final order is set forth in Section
2505.02 of the Ohio Revised Code:
An order that affects a substantial right in an action which in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment, an order that affects a
substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary
application in an action after judgment, or an order that vacates or sets
aside a judgment or grants a new trial is a final order that may be
reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial. 190
The interplay between Art. IV. Section 3(B)(2) and Section 2505.02 does much
to explain the development of what has become known as a special proceeding
in Ohio. There is no provision in either the Ohio Constitution or Ohio Revised
Code Section 2505.02 for an appeal of an interlocutory order.191 Thus, the Ohio
Supreme Court has had to rely on the special proceeding prong of
Section 2505.02 in order to create the judicial exceptions to the final order rule
that it considers important.192
Thus, the essential question is: if the General Assembly placed a version of
the ABA proposal for review of interlocutory orders into the final order rule,
would the rule exceed the powers granted to the General Assembly by Art. IV,
Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution? This question cannot be precisely
answered, but the Ohio Constitution, in limiting the General Assembly's
187That philosophy is clearly stated in General Elec. Supply Co. v. Warden Elec., Inc.,
528 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 1988). "This court has always been reluctant to allow immediate
review of rulings made during the pendency of an action." Id. at 197 (quoting Columbus
v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887,890 (Ohio 1984)).
18 80HIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(2). Cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. 111 (Congress' power to define
the jurisdiction of appellate courts is not limited to "judgments or final orders").
18 9State v. Collins, 265 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Ohio 1970)(citing Youngstown Mun. Ry. v.
Youngstown, 70 N.E.2d 649 (Ohio 1946)).
190 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Anderson 1991).
19 1OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02.
192 See Collins, 265 N.E.2d at 262.
19931
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
authority to determine appellate jurisdiction, does refer to "judgments or final
orders."193 The Ohio Supreme Court has had no problem reviewing non-final
orders when they were given the label, "special proceeding."194 But the term
"special proceeding" has a long history of respectability in terms of its status as
a final appealable order.195 If explicit language were amended to
section 2505.02 making a provision for the appeal of interlocutory orders, it
well might be deemed repugnant to Art. IV, section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio
Constitution.
Another method the General Assembly might employ is to codify the
meaning of the phrase "special proceeding" to include both its classical
meaning 196 and a version of the ABA's proposal for discretionary interlocutory
appeals.197 Given the Ohio Supreme Court's willingness to tolerate its own
modifications of the meaning of a special proceeding, it is unlikely that it could
justify blocking an effort by the General Assembly to codify what is already a
substantial departure from the original meaning of the term, "special
proceeding."198
VII. EPILOGUE: AMATO AFTER POLIKOFF AND BELL
On August 11, 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court announced decisions in Polikoff
v. Adam199 and Bell v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center.200 Polikoff explicity overrules
Amato and substitutes in its place the classical view of special proceedings as
advocated by Justice Douglas.201 Bell purports to apply the new classical
193 OHIO CoNsT. art. IV, § 3(B)(2).
194 See State ex rel. Leis v. Kraft, 460 N.E.2d 1372, 1372 (Ohio 1984)(concluding that
Amato-type interlocutory appeals must be constitutional since they are special
proceedings).
195 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
19 6The classical view of special proceedings is expressed by Justice Douglas in
Tilberry v. Body, 493 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio 1986)(Douglas, J., dissenting). See supra notes
43-47 and accompanying text.
197The importance of retaining the classical meaning of the term, "special proceeding,"
is illustrated by Missionary Soc'y of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ely, 47 N.E. 37 (Ohio
1897)(holding that an order denying the application of a will to the probate court is not
reviewable unless it is a special proceeding).
1981t also seems plausible that the Ohio Supreme Court could, itself, define a special
proceeding in accordance with the ABA plan, although such an approach would have
no basis in the court's precedents involving special proceedings, and thus the court
might be understandably reluctant to assume such a task.
199616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio 1993).
200616 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 1993).
201Justice Resnick, writing for a unanimous court stated: "[w]e determine that orders
that are entered in actions that were recognized at common law or in equity and were
not specially created by statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant
to R.C. 2505.02." Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 218. Seesupra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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approach in rejecting the availability of an interlocutory appeal.202 While the
classical view of special proceedings is arguably a more faithful interpretation
of the original understanding of special proceedings, serious problems are
presented by the classical view, and it is unlikely that Polikoff will be the last
word on the subject of interlocutory appeals in Ohio.
As pointed out by Professor Martineau, there is a reason why every
jurisdiction in the United States has made some provision for exceptions to the
final judgment rule. The reason is that the requirement of finality before an
appeal often conflicts with a litigant's need to receive review of intermediate
determinations made in judicial proceedings in order to avoid irreparable
harm.203 Ohio's approach to interlocutory appeals as expressed in Polikoff
simply turns back the clock to the distant past and ignores the policy questions
that have led every other jurisdiction in the United States to formulate
principles that take into account the inherent tension between the final
judgment rule and fairness to litigants.
Under Polikoff, no interlocutory appeals will be permitted unless the order
appealed from was made in a special statutory proceeding. As a result, the
availability of interlocutory appeals will depend on a formalistic analysis of
the kind of proceeding in which an order was made.204 In addition, an order
made in a special statutory proceeding will be reviewable regardless of whether
irreparable harm can be shown or if the special statutory proceeding is itself
final or completed.205 Thus, the "new" approach is both over and
underinclusive. A host of interlocutory orders that present litigants with
irreparable harm will be unreviewable, while orders of no particular
consequence will be reviewable simply by virtue of having occurred in the
context of a proceeding created by statute.
The decision in Bell v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center illustrates an already emerging
crack in the Ohio Supreme Court's new resolve to limit interlocutory
appeals. 206 In rejecting the immediate appealability of a trial court order
202 Bel, 616 N.E.2d at 185.
203MARTINEAU, supra note 2, at 48, 60-1.
204polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 218.
20SBell, 616 N.E.2d at 185 n.2.
206 Bell involved an appeal from a trial court order compelling an in camera inspection
of materials alleged to be protected by attorney client privilege. Id. at 183. The order was
made in the context of an action for prejudgment interest, which the Ohio Supreme
Court readily agreed was a special proceeding, since an action for prejudgment interest
is created by statute. Id. The court found that the order was not appealable because no
substantial rights were implicated since the in camera inspection would serve only to
allow the trial court to make a determination of whether the materials were discoverable.
Id. at 184. The court suggests that if the trial court's order had required disclosure to the
opposing party, then the order would be appealable. Id. at 184-85. Under the Ohio
Supreme Court's new approach, the appealability of such an order greatly depends on
the sheer accident that it occur in the context of a proceeding created by statute,
otherwise it is not appealable.
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compelling an in camera inspection of alleged privileged material, the court
appears to pretend that irreparable harm can still form the basis of review of
interlocutory orders.207 Also, the court found it necessary to distinguish
Humphry208 and Port Clinton Fisheries209 from the dispute before it as opposed
to adhering to the view dictated by Polikoff, namely that the results reached in
those cases are in doubt given the Polikoffdecision. 210 In addition, the Bell court
found it necessary to employ revisionist history when confronted with its
holding in Nelson, by stating that the analysis employed in Nelson revolved
around the first prong of Ohio's final order rule rather than the second prong,
which is patently incorrect. 211 Given the appearance of backpedaling and the
outright intellectual dishonestly of the Bell decision, it seems certain that the
groundwork is once again being laid for departures from the classical view of
special proceedings. 212
As for the future of interlocutory appeals in Ohio, the long winding road is
likely to begin anew. As the decision in Bell suggests, the return to the classical
view of special proceedings is likely to be just another starting point in a series
of convoluted decisions generated by the results-oriented jurisprudence of the
Ohio Supreme Court. What Ohio needs is a cohesive doctrine governing
interlocutory appeals and an abandonment of both "academic genealogy" 213
and ad hoc determinations of appealability based on the bare intuitions of the
ranking members of Ohio's judiciary.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Special proceedings in Ohio are inexorably intertwined with the complex
issue of when to allow appeals from the determinations of a court of law. The
history of Ohio Supreme Court cases, particularly since 1970, evince a diligent
attempt to formulate a decisional rule of when to allow appeals from
interlocutory orders. The Ohio Supreme Court is, in the final analysis, as much
a victim of Ohio's final order rule as it is to blame for promulgating a series of
unsatisfactory doctrines governing the appealability of interlocutary orders.
207The court's opinion suggests that the "substantial right" requirement of the special
proceeding prong of Ohio's final judgment rule can still be satisfied by a showing of
irreparable harm in the absence of immediate appellate review. Id. at 184. But, under
the Polikoffapproach, such rights can only be vindicated if they happen to be threatened
in the context of a proceeding created by statute. Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 218.
208See supra note 112.
209See discussion of Port Clinton Fisheries supra part IV.
21OBell, 616 N.E.2d at 184.
211See id. at 185 n.2; see also discussion of Nelson supra part IV.
2 12 It is worth noting that Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment only in Bell and
did not file an opinion. 616 N.E.2d 181.
213See discussion of Collins supra part Ill.
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Solutions (or at least preferable approaches) to the problem of when to allow
interlocutory appeals are available, such as the ABA plan. Ohio would be well
served by undertaking the task of implementing improvements of its system
of appellate practice. As a result of such an effort, scarce judicial resources
would be used more optimally and the quality of justice would be improved.
DONALD I. GITLIN
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